File:Securitization Market Activity.png

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描述
English: Image from Economist Mark Zandi's FCIC Testimony

Explanation

From Economist Mark Zandi's January 2010 testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: "The securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and CDOs remains dormant."[1] Banks and other financial institutions packaged various types of loans (including mortgages) into securities and sold them to global investors. This is called securitization. In exchange for purchasing the investment, the investor receives a right to the cash flows from the underlying loans specified for the security. The chart shows how this financing source dried-up, meaning that non-prime mortgages and other types of loans could not be originated and sold to investors.

来源 http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Zandi.pdf
作者 Farcaster (talk) 04:36, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

许可协议

Public domain
此作品在美国属于公有领域,因为其是由美国政府的官员或雇员,基于其个人公务目的制作的作品,参考美国法典第17篇第1章第105条
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